Linguistic Monoculture in LLM-Assisted Language Use

2026-07-29Artificial Intelligence

Artificial IntelligenceComputation and LanguageComputer Science and Game Theory
AI summary

The authors study how using large language models (LLMs) to help write and communicate might reduce variety in how people express themselves, leading to a "linguistic monoculture." They create a math model describing how authors and LLMs influence each other's language choices over time through different ways of interaction. Their results show that shared models tend to make authors sound more alike, while personalized models help keep some diversity. They also explore how authors balance the benefits of fitting in vs. being unique, finding that individual choices can lead to less diversity than is good for the community overall.

large language modelslinguistic diversitymathematical modelingequilibriaconformitypersonalizationfeedback mechanismsexternalitiescommunicationlanguage evolution
Authors
Suhas Thejaswi, Juhi Kulshreshta, Lutz Oettershagen
Abstract
Writing and communication are increasingly mediated by large language models (LLMs) that are being used to draft, revise and polish text. Although such assistance can improve clarity and help authors meet institutional expectations, widespread reliance on shared models may reduce population-level variation in linguistic form, a phenomenon we refer to as linguistic monoculture. We develop a mathematical framework in which authors and LLMs are represented as distributions over linguistic features and coevolve through repeated interaction. We analyze three interaction mechanisms: a shared model with a fixed linguistic distribution, a shared model recursively updated from author outputs, and personalized models updated through author-specific and population-level feedback. We characterize the resulting equilibria and convergence rates, showing that, shared models can drive authors toward a common norm, recursive feedback relocates the shared norm without altering pairwise spread under common conformity, and personalization can preserve a family of distinct author-model equilibria with nonzero linguistic diversity. We then endogenize conformity as a strategic choice trading off private benefits from clarity, legibility, and perceived fluency against distinctive style. Within this utility model, individually rational authors may conform more than is socially optimal because they do not internalize the value their distinctiveness provides to others, creating a negative externality and a price of monoculture that is finite for each fixed instance but can grow without bound when distinctiveness dominates authenticity. Synthetic simulations illustrate how fixed shared assistance, recursive feedback, and personalization produce different long-run diversity outcomes.