Radio-Frequency Side-Channel Analysis of a Trapped-Ion Quantum Computer
2026-03-06 • Cryptography and Security
Cryptography and Security
AI summaryⓘ
The authors found a new way that information can leak from trapped-ion quantum computers, similar to how classical computers can have hidden weak spots. This leak comes from radio-frequency (RF) signals used to control lasers that operate the quantum bits (ions). They showed how someone could detect these leaked signals and figure out details about quantum gate operations. The authors also suggest ways to prevent this kind of information leak in the future.
trapped-ion quantum processorsside channel attackradio-frequency leakageacousto-optical modulators (AOMs)quantum gatesquantum computing securityquditslaser modulation
Authors
Giorgio Grigolo, Dorian Schiffer, Lukas Gerster, Martin Ringbauer, Paul Erker
Abstract
Analogously to classical computers, quantum processors exhibit side channels that may give attackers access to potentially proprietary algorithms. We identify and exploit a previously unexplored side channel in trapped-ion quantum processors that arises from the radio-frequency (RF) signals used to modulate lasers for ion cooling, gate execution, and readout. In these quantum processors, acousto-optical modulators (AOMs) imprint phase and frequency modulations onto laser fields interacting with the ions to implement individual and collective unitaries. The AOMs are driven by strong RF signals, a fraction of which leaks out of the device. We discuss general strategies to exploit this side channel and demonstrate how to detect RF leakage from a state-of-the-art qudit-based quantum processor using off-the-shelf components. From this data, we extract pulse characteristics of single-ion and entangling gates, thereby implementing a proof-of-principle exploitation of the novel attack vector. Finally, we outline ways to mitigate the information leakage through the presented side channel.